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Bribery is a complex phenomenon rooted in both individual motives and the greater
institutional context. Experimental research into causal mechanisms that drive bribing
behavior is still scarce. To date, there is no empirical evidence on how the society-
regarding motivational survey measure of Public Service Motivation (PSM) and the
other-oriented motivational measure of Social Value Orientation (SVO) can help explain
why some people are more susceptible to engage in the act of bribing than others.
Based on a multi-site triple-replication, and a vignette-based research design, quasi-
experimental evidence from Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands shows that both
measures interact and that—paradoxically—people with higher SVO are more likely to
be willing to engage in bribery.
Keywords: bribery, corruption, social value orientation (SVO), public service motivation (PSM), multi-site design
INTRODUCTION
Bribery is still a wicked problem that does not seem to go away so easily, or at all, in many
countries across the world. Bribery comes with very high social costs, undermining the sense
of fairness. Bribery has macro-, meso-, and micro-level roots. First, a macro lens is required to
explain differences across countries. Clearly, a society’s institutional context matters (Montinola
and Jackman, 2002; Adelopo and Rufai, 2020). Second, in case of organization-level bribery, a
meso lens is needed as organizational factors are argued to play an important role as well (den
Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008; Shaheer et al., 2019). Third, a micro perspective is required to
understand individual variation within countries and across organizational contexts, as not all
people equally engage in bribery within the same institutional and organizational environment
(Navot et al., 2016). In the literature, the macro, meso, and micro perspectives live, by and large,
separate lives in different disciplinary silos. For example, in Sociology, the importance of the
institutional context for explaining bribery is emphasized; in Psychology, individual characteristics
and motives are examined as the key drivers of bribery; and in Organization Studies, the main focus
is on the meso-level roots of bribery.
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The primary aim of this study is to contribute to the micro
lens in a three-country study examining whether an individual’s
Public Service Motivation (PSM) and Social Value Orientation
(SVO) can help explain why some people are more likely than
others to engage in bribery (Kwon, 2014). By including PSM
and SVO, we link a well-established construct from Public
Administration (PSM) with modern motivational theory in Social
Psychology (SVO). As we will argue in greater detail below,
PSM is an explicit survey measure of a critical motivational
attitude regarding contributing to society at large, whilst SVO
is an individual’s motivational other-regarding trait. We develop
hypotheses as to how both characteristics in isolation and in
tandem can be expected to affect the likelihood that an individual
will engage in an act of bribery.
Specifically, the current study reports findings of a between-
subject randomized vignette-based quasi-experiment regarding
bribery within student samples from universities in Belgium
(n = 220), Germany (n = 211), and the Netherlands (n = 193). The
three treatments involve vignettes that differ in the seriousness
of the bribery act in an educational setting in order to
include sufficient contextual variation. The responses to these
vignettes measure bribery willingness. We add a complementary
questionnaire to measure key constructs that capture PSM and
SVO as important potential micro determinants of bribery. The
first, Public Service Motivation (PSM), is a concept that is central
in Public Administration research. The second, Social Value
Orientation (SVO), is a well-known notion in Social Psychology.
In doing so, we develop a multidisciplinary theory combining
the society-oriented construct of PSM with the individual-
focused concept of SVO. By combining randomized vignettes
with this pair of survey-based measures, we have a quasi-
experimental design, with a treatment (bribery seriousness) and
two individual characteristics (PSM and SVO), with willingness
(to bribe) as the outcome.
In all, this article presents findings from three studies,
replicating a novel quasi-experiment in three countries,
examining the impact of PSM as a society-regarding motivational
attitude and SVO as an other-oriented motivational value on
bribery willingness. One aspect of the research design is worth
emphasizing in advance, as this links to the macro perspective.
Our study compares three countries that vary little in the macro
incidence of bribery: Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.
By design, we opted for the method of agreement as we aim
to explore the replicability of our findings in similar contexts
(Hilton et al., 1995; Walker et al., 2019). This results in a
multi-site research design with three country contexts sufficiently
alike to conduct replications without dominant contextual
noise that would threaten comparability (Walker et al., 2019).
This macro perspective is reflected upon in the discussion
section, offering a limited discussion of a few cross-country
differences to explore post hoc the macro lens, suggesting
interesting avenues for future research. As a side-benefit, by
running the quasi-experiment in three countries, this research
responds to the appeal to conduct replication studies (see, e.g.,
van Witteloostuijn, 2016; Walker et al., 2019). By doing so, we
can reflect on the generalizability of the findings, including a
discussion of the boundary conditions of our theory.
THEORY
Bribery
Bribery is a multi-facetted and many-faced phenomenon. We
start from the Cambridge Dictionary’s common sense definition
as “an attempt to make someone do something for you by giving
the person money, presents, or something else that they want.”
Heidenheimer (2009) distinguishes three shades of bribery: Black
bribery, gray bribery, and white bribery. Black bribery is a
particular action that by majority consensus of public opinion
should be condemned and punished on grounds of principle.
Gray bribery implies that limited elements in society, usually
elites, may want to see the actions punished and that the
majority may well be ambiguous. White bribery is tolerated by
the majority of both elite and mass opinion, and attempts to
punish this form of bribery are not likely to find public support
(Heidenheimer, 2009).
According to Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn (2014), bribery
is defined as “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a
private favor for actions or decisions from influential or powerful
agents or authorities which could be public officials, corporations
or people inside corporations to generate private benefits
of the briber.” Cultural and institutional differences across
countries and regions play an important role in determining
the incidence of bribery (Martin et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008).
For instance, bribery is usually found to be high in countries
with limited political competition and low GDP per capita
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Wilhelm, 2002). Furthermore,
the organizational context plays an important role in explaining
bribery, as bribery has been found to be especially likely in
highly competitive contexts in which managers fail to correct
corrupt behavior and in situations in which employees feel
pressured to ward off identity threats to the organization
(den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008).
However, the likelihood of bribery cannot be explained
exclusively by referring to the macro or meso environment.
Prior research by, for instance, Martin et al. (2007), Jávor
and Jancsics (2016), and Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn
(2012a,b) demonstrates the critical importance of individual
micro attributes. Individual characteristics such as age, gender
and education, but also personal risk preferences are argued to
have an effect on the likelihood that an individual person will offer
and/or accept bribes (Alatas et al., 2009; Nichols and Robertson,
2017). In this context, the potential effect of a key construct
in Public Administration research—Public Service Motivation
(PSM)—has not been examined in great detail, to date. Yet, PSM
is argued to be a critical determinant guiding behavior aimed
to benefit communities or societies at large (Esteve et al., 2015;
Kim and Kim, 2016; van Witteloostuijn et al., 2017). As a starting
point, therefore, we first theorize how PSM might impact the
likelihood that an individual will engage in the act of bribing.
Public Service Motivation
Public Service Motivation (PSM) is one of the most prominent
concepts in both Public Administration and Public Management
research. As one of the pioneers of the PSM concept, Perry (1996)
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describes PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions.”
PSM originally consists of six motives: Civic duty, social justice,
commitment to the public interest, self-sacrifice, compassion,
and attraction to public interest (Perry, 1996). The concept
of PSM has evolved greatly over time, with much scholarship
examining PSM’s antecedents, definitions, consequences, and
measures (Bozeman and Su, 2015). For instance, Coursey and
Pandey (2007), Vandenabeele (2008), Kim (2009), and Esteve
et al. (2016) consolidated PSM, shaping its current and most
widely used four-dimensional form, comprising attraction to
policy-making (APM), commitment to public interest (CPI),
compassion (COM), and self-sacrifice (SS).
The potential link between PSM and bribery has been referred
to in conceptual, normative, and theoretical terms. However, to
date, a detailed empirical study is yet to be conducted (Kim
and Kim, 2016). From a theoretical perspective, the argument is
very straightforward and highly intuitive. After all, by the very
definition of the construct, the expectation is that high-PSM
people prioritize serving the public interest, even to the extent
of sacrificing their own self-interest. This motive strongly goes
against any form of bribery that involves serving self-interest at
the expense of the public. Indeed, the literature has argued that
people scoring high on PSM are, on average, more sensitive to
unfair competition and do strongly oppose unethical behavior,
of which bribery is a clear example (Kwon, 2014; Kim and Kim,
2016; Wright et al., 2016; Wang and Seifert, 2020). This gives our
intuitive baseline hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): The relationship between public service
motivation and the likelihood to engage in bribery is negative,
implying that individuals’ likelihood of engaging in bribery
decreases with higher levels of public service motivation.
Social Value Orientation
Traditional normative theories of behavior assume that (i)
people are rational decision-makers and that (ii) they are mainly
motivated by self-interest (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Yet, subsequent theoretical
advancements indicate that individuals systematically differ in
the manner in which they interact with independent others
(Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; van Lange and Kuhlman,
1994). Fundamental psychological work such as that of Bogaert
et al. (2008) and Balliet et al. (2009) shows that this
systematic divergence from pure self-serving behavior is related
to individuals’ Social Value Orientation (SVO). This concept,
according to Messick and McClintock (1968), refers to a stable
preference for certain outcomes for oneself against others’
outcomes, thus capturing the extent to which an individual
is intrinsically mainly concerned with personal versus group
well-being. In the SVO literature, many scholars use an ideal-
typical binary categorization, pro-self-vis-à-vis pro-social (but see
Murphy and Ackermann, 2014). On the one hand, pro-self people
knowingly or subconsciously work toward the realization of their
personal goals with little or no regard to other peoples’ goals,
whereas, on the other hand, their pro-social counterparts also
consider the goals of others, attaching more importance to the
well-being of a community or society as a whole.
Social value orientation is strongly related with pro-social
and ethical behavior. According to Batson and Powell (2003),
pro-social behavior covers a wide range of actions intended
to benefit one or more people other than oneself, such as
caring, helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperating. These
behaviors can benefit family, coworkers, customers, teams,
stakeholders or an organization or community as a whole
(Bolino and Grant, 2016). Pro-social behavior is positively
linked with individual organizational outcomes such as job
performance, organizational commitment, and career success.
Based on processes of reciprocity, such behavior creates strong
and weak ties, leading to the construction of social capital (Bolino
et al., 2002; Shah et al., 2018). Furthermore, pro-social individuals
are perceived as being less threatening to others, which makes
them valued allies instead of competitors (Casciaro and Lobo,
2008; Bendell, 2017). De Cremer and van Lange (2001), in line
with earlier research by Sattler and Kerr (1991), argue that high-
SVO people reveal a greater concern for others and for the group,
and that they judge more in terms of non-egoistic values such as
fairness, honesty, and equality.
The above logic has a clear implication relevant for
understanding the relation between SVO and the likelihood to
engage in self-focused bribery, very similar to that of PSM.
Basically, pro-self individuals will be more likely to engage
in bribery to serve their self-interest than their pro-social
counterparts, given that the very definition of bribery implies an
act of self-interest. Hence, SVO is expected, as is overall PSM,
to be negatively related to the likelihood of engaging in bribery.
Consequently, we have our second baseline hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): The relationship between social value
orientation and the likelihood to engage in bribery is negative,
implying that individuals’ likelihood of engaging in bribery
decreases with higher levels of social value orientation.
PSM and SVO in Tandem
Taking Public Administration’s PSM and Social Psychology’s SVO
together, we can identify two further channels of influence on an
individual’s bribery likelihood. The first is that SVO, as an other-
regarding motivational value, may moderate the impact of PSM,
as a society-regarding motivational attitude. On the one hand,
in Public Administration, an ongoing debate revolves around
the question as to whether PSM is an individual attitude or
trait, or a combination of the two, with clear evidence that the
attitudinal dimension is prominent (see, e.g., van Witteloostuijn
et al., 2017). On the other hand, in line with modern motivational
theory in Psychology, SVO is seen as an individual trait (see, e.g.,
Grant, 2008). Hence, we could argue that the attitudinal effect of
high PSM is stronger if supported by a trait-driven “multiplier”
of a pro-other SVO. That is, if an individual indicates s/he is
motivated to serve the public interest, which includes a general
motivation to self-sacrifice for the sake of others’ benefit, then
this motivational attitude is further boosted if this individual is
characterized by the other-regarding trait of SVO as well.
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HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): Social value orientation positively
moderates the relationship between public service motivation
and the likelihood to engage in bribery.
The second additional channel of influence involves
mediation. Implicitly, our hypotheses above suggest a specific
relationship between a society-regarding attitude (PSM) and
an other-regarding trait (SVO) motive, the latter mediating the
effect of the former. Human motives are defined as someone’s
capacity to experience a specific type of stimulus, incentive or
activity as pleasurable, hence directing behavior (Schultheiss and
Brunstein, 2010). Such motives, which can be explicit or implicit,
involve stable differences in desires from which people derive
pleasure (McClelland et al., 1989). Here, combining this with
PSM, we see a parallel with motivational theory’s argument that
some (explicit) motives “push” individuals toward actions that
they enjoy (“want-to” behavior), whereas other (implicit) motives
“pull” them toward actions that they feel obliged to (“have-to”
behaviors) (Kehr, 2004; Hermans et al., 2017). Similarly, we
would argue that a contextual pull to serve the public interest
due to high PSM is triggered further through a “push” running
through an individual’s other-regarding value due to high SVO.
HYPOTHESIS 4 (H4): Social value orientation partially
mediates the relationship between public service motivation and
the likelihood to engage in bribery.
The full model is summarized in Figure 1.
Note that we have no a priori predictions regarding sub-
dimensions of PSM (see above) or sub-aspects of bribery
willingness (see below), given lack of any extant work on this.
However, inductively, we will conduct exploratory analyses to
identify any meaningful finer-grained relationship.
METHODS
Multi-National and Multi-Site Vignettes
Experiment
An original multi-site vignettes quasi-experiment was conducted
as an online survey with three independent country samples
from April to August 2017. This experiment was programmed
and hosted with Qualtrics’ software, and distributed via e-mail
invitation among students of four university faculties in Belgium,
Germany, and the Netherlands, across a variety of economic and
social sciences, ranging from public and for-profit management,
to political sciences, socio-economic studies, and business
engineering. Participation was voluntary. In each country,
students were incentivized with the possibility of winning one
of four significant (1 x €250, 1 x €150, and 2 x €50) gift
certificates for a well-known online retailer. The English scale
items were translated into Dutch (for both Belgium and the
Netherlands) and German, and slightly adapted to the local
context to accommodate the specific national conditions of
higher education. The dataset was strictly pre-stratified for
missing and repetitive responses, and comprises only complete
non-skewed (centralized) responses. In the prospect of small
effect sizes (Cohen’s d ≤ |0.3|; power = 0.8; α = 0.05), conservative
estimates prior to data collection indicate that the necessary
absolute sample size requires n = 176 respondents per study (Ellis,
2010). This has been achieved.
Vignettes are stimuli in the form of narrative and realistic
scenarios in which participants are invited to imagine that they
have to act in the vignette’s context, and respond accordingly to
a series of survey items (Hughes and Huby, 2004). Vignettes are
proven to be very useful treatment instruments in experiments
with the power to systematically manipulate and trigger context-
dependent behavior at high degrees of both internal and external
validity (Aguinis and Bradley, 2014). The quasi-experiment
(see Supplementary Appendix A.1 for detailed procedures and
vignettes) is composed of four parts: (1) A short introduction;
(2) a socio-demographic questionnaire with control variables to
warrant sample balancing; (3) standardized measures of PSM
and SVO (our key independent variables); and (4) a randomized
vignettes treatment.
Independent and Control Variables
Central to our design are PSM and SVO, being a society-
regarding attitudinal and an other-regarding value motivation
measure, respectively. PSM can be easily measured via a well-
validated self-report questionnaire, whereas SVO is frequently
captured through a well-established forced-choice revealed
preference survey measure. First, following Esteve et al. (2015,
2016), PSM was measured with Kim et al.’s (2013) twelve-item
Likert-type scale in its four-dimensional conceptualization (see
FIGURE 1 | Conceptual framework.
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Supplementary Appendix A.2 for all items and psychometrics,
per sample). The scale items were translated with a double-blind
back-translation procedure to maximize reliability. Items must be
scored from 1 = “absolutely disagree” to 7 = “absolutely agree.”
The Cronbach’s α is 0.82 for the Belgian (AIC = 0.462), 0.87
for the German (AIC = 0.693), and 0.84 for the Dutch sample
(AIC = 0.564), and 0.84 for the pooled data. We use mean
sum scores for PSM overall (pooled data: Cronbach’s α = 0.84;
AIC = 0.571; AVE = 0.323; Chi2 (54) = 54,346; p < 0.000;
GFI = 0.731; RMSEA = 0.141; CFI = 0.731).
Social value orientation was measured with Bogaert et al.’s
(2012) validated procedure, which is based on a well-established
forced-choice technique to capture revealed preferences
(Supplementary Appendix A.3). Respondents have to make
decisions over a total of nine scenarios based on the classic
Dictator Game setup, in which they decide about what
proportion of a hypothetical reward of, on average, €500 they
are willing to share with another anonymous person. Each
scenario offered three systematically varied choice options that
are each characteristic for either a competitive choice (e.g., €480
for self and €80 for other), individualistic choice (e.g., €540 for
self and €280 for other), or pro-social choice (e.g., €480 for self
and €480 for other) (Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Bogaert
et al., 2012). Counting the number of pro-social choices, this
measure results in a compound ranking score ranging from 0
to 9 for each participant, in which higher scores indicate higher
SVO. This caters to the critique of categorized measures of SVO
(Murphy and Ackermann, 2014).
Intuitively, PSM and SVO are related constructs, both rooted
in the motivation to care for others. Theoretically, above we
argue and assume that both constructs are different, PSM
being attitude-based and society-regarding, and SVO being
trait-based and other-regarding. Indeed, the nature of both
measures is very different, with PSM being measured with
an attitudinal questionnaire scale, and SVO with revealed
preferences in the form of a series of forced-choice scenarios.
So, the question is to what extent both measures are indeed
different empirically. In our three sub-samples and the pooled
sample, they clearly are, with r = −0.40 (p = 0.000)
in the Belgian, r = −0.435 (p = 0.000) in the Dutch,
and r = −0.394 (p = 0.000) in the German sub-sample,
aggregating into r = −0.412 (p = 0.000) in the pooled
sample. Empirically, these negative Pearson correlation values
confirm our expectation that our two measures tap into two
different constructs, implying that we can run meaningful
statistical analyses.
As a key control variable, participants’ risk attitude was
assessed with Madden et al.’s (2009) Probability Discounting
Questionnaire, a measure that estimates revealed behavior under
risk based on responses to a systematic and randomized set of
economic trade-off tasks, which result in a metric discounting
parameter ln(h) for each individual (see Weißmüller (2021) for
more detail and the aggregation algorithm). Compared with
stated preferences, revealed behavior is a more reliable indicator
for people’s actual behavior outside the study context. Since
higher discounting parameters indicate stronger probability
discounting, individuals with ln(h) > 0 are characterized as
risk averse. The other control variables are the usual socio-
demographic suspects (see Table 1 for details): respondent’s age,
gender, and religiosity. Finally, we control for country-of-origin,
as our main analysis is performed with the data pooled over our
three country samples (see below).
Experimental Treatment Vignettes
Respondents were randomly assigned to two out of three bribery
vignettes, which were designed with due diligence following
Hughes and Huby (2004). Treatment randomization is an
essential requirement for (quasi-) experimental research seeking
to infer causal relations (Jilke and Van Ryzin, 2017). The balance
between treatment groups was strictly controlled for, with success
(see Table 1). The vignettes were designed to represent Ramdani
and van Witteloostuijn’s (2014) three shades of bribery, ranging
from white via gray to black forms of bribery. They comprise
realistic scenarios in which respondents were in the active role
of a student proposing a bribery offer to a professor in exchange
of reconsideration of an important exam score. The external
validity of this approach was corroborated with an expert panel,
as suggested by Gould (1996). Furthermore, adequate pre-tests
with students and focus groups were conducted in the process
of pretesting the survey items with a relevant pilot sample
(Wilson and While, 1998).
In the white bribery vignette, the student does not offer
anything material to the teacher, but only engages in an emotional
plea. This vignette may even be argued to be so white that this
does not involve bribery at all. But still, the student does ask
the teacher to engage in an act—i.e., adjusting a grade upward—
that is taken to be unethical in many countries, and certainly so
in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the gray bribery
vignette, the bribery act does come with a material favor, offering
to take care of a car repair for free. In the Belgian, Dutch, and
German higher university context, this clearly comes down to a
bribery act, albeit one which does not involve an actual exchange
of money. In the black bribery vignette, the latter is offered, which
is a considered a clear and unambiguous example of bribery in
our set of three countries. And what is crucial in the context of
our treatment effect, the three vignettes can clearly be ranked in
order of the seriousness of the involved offer, from weak (white)
via medium (gray) to strong (black).
Dependent Variables
We developed a novel measure for respondents’ willingness to
engage in bribery, which we refer to as Willingness to Bribe
(WtB). WtB and its underlying components (see below) serve
as our main dependent variables. After each vignette treatment,
respondents were asked to indicate how they would react in this
specific scenario by answering four Likert-type items ranging
from 1 = “absolutely disagree” to 5 = “absolutely agree.” These
four items were designed to load onto respondents’ attitudes
regarding bribing the professor in the respective scenarios—
by asking how likely they were to bribe in this context
(likelihood), how justified offering the bribe was (justification),
how comfortable they would feel in doing so (affect), and whether
offering a bribe would be a mistake (mistake), which was a reverse
item for control. These four factor items are, first, analyzed as
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Sampling site Belgium Germany The Netherlands
N 220 211 193
Experimental treatment
White bribery (%) a 34.7 33.8 34.2
Gray bribery (%) a 34.8 33.8 31.4
Black bribery (%) a 34.9 34.2 30.8
Motivation
Society-oriented:
Public Service Motivation (PSM); M ± SD 5.53 ± 0.85 5.26 ± 0.98 5.38 ± 0.92
Attraction to Policy Making 5.94 ± 1.14 5.47 ± 1.32 5.86 ± 1.06
Commitment to Public Interest 5.72 ± 1.03 5.52 ± 1.13 5.39 ± 1.15
Compassion 5.60 ± 1.15 5.61 ± 1.14 5.55 ± 1.05
Self-Sacrifice 5.18 ± 1.17 4.73 ± 1.19 5.01 ± 1.36
Other-oriented:
Social Value Orientation (SVO); M ± SD 6.51 ± 3.57 4.83 ± 2.93 6.11 ± 3.76
Socio-demographic characteristics
Gender, male (n) a 48.2% (104) 45.2% (95) 48.2% (93)
Age in years a 22.47 ± 3.65 25.84 ± 4.82 21.13 ± 2.82
Risk aversion (revealed) b 1.57 ± 0.65 0.65 ± 0.62 0.96 ± 0.61
Nationality
Belgian 89.1% (196) . .
German . 88.6% (187) 3.1% (6)
Dutch 8.6% (19) . 93.3% (180)
Other 2.3% (5) 11.4% (24) 3.6% (7)
Religiosity, yes (n) 50.5% (111) 59.2% (125) 32.6% (63)
Items are either reported with geometric means and standard deviations (M ± SD) or proportions (%) and frequencies (n); atreatment distribution checked for balance
with two-tailed t-tests within and between studies; all non-significant; b logarithmic probability discounting parameter, centralized.
separate components, but are in subsequent steps of the analysis
geometrically sum-scored to form WtB.
The validity of this aggregation procedure was tested
with exploratory factor analysis (varimax rotated with Kaiser
normalization for item correlation), which confirmed very
high internal validity and robustness against country effects
when repeated separately for each of the three study samples
(see Supplementary Appendix A.4). The resulting dependent
variable is normally distributed across all treatment conditions
(shades of bribery) [tested with Shapiro-Wilk; vignette 1:
W(409) = 0.991, p = 0.015; vignette 2: W(417) = 0.954, p = 0.000;
vignette 3: W(415) = 0.892, p = 0.000], and thus allows for
linear regression analysis. As a control variable, respondents
were asked to rate how realistic they found the scenario on
a four-point Likert-type single item, ranging from 1 = “very
unrealistic” to 4 = “very realistic.” We control for balanced
perceived vignette scenario realism—as a proxy for verisimilitude
of the treatment condition—to guarantee high ecological validity
of the estimation model.
Model Estimation
Because study participants always responded to two vignettes,
linear regression analysis was conducted with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the subject level to account
for latent vignette clustering effects. The dependent variable is
aggregated WtB or the four components of WtB, respectively.
As we explain below, we pooled the data across our three
country samples. Subsequently, in our main analysis, we run
three models, as reported in Table 2: Models I include control
variables only, Models II add PSM and SVO to test our main effect
hypotheses (H1 and H2), and Models III explore the PSM∗SVO
moderation effect (H3). White bribery and the Belgian sample
serve as arbitrary reference categories. In a second exploratory
modeling step, we investigate the effect of each of the four
classic dimensions of PSM by including APM, CPI, COM,
and SS separately in the split and pooled regression models
presented in the online Supplementary Appendix Table A.5.1
in Supplementary Appendix A.5, to safe space. Finally, we
conduct a moderated mediation test, reported in Figure 2, to
find out to what extent, if at all, PSM operates as a partial
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TABLE 2 | Regression estimates on Willingness to Bribe (pooled data).
Likelihood Justification Affect Mistake Willingness to Bribe
I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III
Public Service −0.042 −0.014 −0.045 −0.057 −0.057 −0.052 0.103** 0.077 −0.013 −0.021
Motivation (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.050) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.063) (0.019) (0.026)
Social Value 0.196** 0.479 0.177** 0.053 0.167** 0.219 −0.172** −0.441 0.124*** 0.056
Orientation (0.067) (0.366) (0.066) (0.412) (0.062) (0.416) (0.076) (0.482) (0.040) (0.219)
Public Service −0.053 0.023 −0.010 0.050 0.015
Motivation * Social
Value Orientation
(0.068) (0.075) (0.077) (0.088) (0.041)
Age 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.014† 0.019* 0.019* −0.000 0.004 0.004 −0.023** −0.029** −0.030** −0.002 −0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female −0.146** −0.112† −0.111† −0.181** −0.149* −0.150* −0.271*** −0.237*** −0.236*** 0.144* 0.098 0.097 −0.143*** −0.124*** −0.124***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
White bribery 0.415*** 0.430*** 0.433*** 0.369*** 0.383*** 0.381*** 0.146* 0.161* 0.162* −0.492*** −0.512*** −0.516*** 0.143** 0.151** 0.150***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070) (0.092) (0.091) (0.090) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Gray bribery - reference category -
Black bribery −0.132† −0.133† −0.131† −0.029 −0.029 −0.030 −0.025 −0.027 −0.026 −0.076 −0.072 −0.074 −0.103* −0.103* −0.103*
(0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Germany −0.083 −0.106 −0.104 0.167* 0.143† 0.143† −0.067 −0.095 −0.095 −0.155 −0.110 −0.111 −0.026 −0.036 −0.037
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Belgium - reference category -
The Netherlands 0.034 0.028 0.037 −0.149* −0.155* −0.155* −0.020 −0.028 −0.028 0.074 0.089 0.090 −0.025 −0.026 −0.026
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Intercept 1.819*** 1.837*** 1.675*** 1.470*** 1.521*** 1.592*** 1.830*** 1.944*** 1.914*** 4.643*** 4.319*** 4.473*** 2.155*** 2.099*** 2.144***
(0.198) (0.277) (0.311) (0.204) (0.292) (0.357) (0.189) (0.296) (0.309) (0.261) (0.363) (0.466) (0.000) (0.163) (0.192)
F 10.97 10.73 9.54 11.85 11.86 10.75 5.46 7.02 6.25 9.46 9.83 8.81 1.31 9.24 8.35
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000
VIF a 1.31 1.29 9.79 1.31 1.29 9.78 1.31 1.29 9.79 1.31 1.29 9.79 0.58 1.29 9.78
R2 0.045 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.063 0.063 0.029 0.043 0.043 0.048 0.061 0.062 −0.002 0.059 0.059
RMSE 1.137 1.131 1.131 1.068 1.062 1.062 0.904 0.897 0.897 1.225 1.216 1.216 (0.004) 0.571 0.571
Linear regression modeling clustered by N = 622 respondents for conditional contribution (n = 1,242 observations), robust standard errors in parentheses; a Mean variance inflation factor (VIF), all VIF ≤ 1.58 in models
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time to completion was 13.6 min. The sample comprises n = 220
respondents, which are slightly dominated by female participants
(51.8%), on average 22.5 (± 3.7) years old, predominantly risk-
averse and non-religious (49.6%), and who study a variety of
business and social sciences, especially Business Administration
(46.8%). Respondents score relatively high on PSM (M = 5.53,
SD = 0.85), especially on the dimensions of APM (M = 5.94,
SD = 1.14) and CPI (M = 5.72, SD = 1.03), and they reveal high
SVO (M = 6.51, SD = 3.57) (see Table 1 for more detail).
Across all treatments, respondents score below the scale’s
medium on WtB (M = 1.87, SD = 0.91). The sample perceived
the vignettes as above-average realistic (M = 2.10, SD = 0.77).
Two-tailed t-testing shows that the vignettes create significant
variance, with WtB strictly decreasing from the white (M = 2.65,
SD = 0.87) to the black bribery scenario (M = 1.31, SD = 0.53),
indicating a strong and robust treatment effect [t(287) = −15.781,
p = 0.000, d = −1.863]. Pair-wise correlation analysis of the
dependent variable by bribery vignette indicates high internal
discriminant validity with very small inter-item covariance
(0.067) and high construct validity of the dependent variable
items (Cronbach’s α = 0.60), which confirms that the three
different vignettes trigger the same underlying concept.
Germany
Respondents of study 2 are n = 211 students in economics and
social sciences, especially Public Administration (n = 38) and
Business Administration (n = 37), at a large public university
in Germany. Respondents were, on average, 25.8 (± 4.8) years
old, predominately female (54.8%), risk-averse, and non-religious
(40.8%). Respondents report high PSM (M = 5.26, SD = 0.98),
with relative high scores in COM (M = 5.61, SD = 1.14)
and relative low scores in SS (M = 4.73, SD = 1.19). On the
nine-point SVO scale, a mean value of 4.83 (± 2.93) is just
slightly above the scale’s average. This sample’s response toward
the realism item is above average (M = 2.23, SD = 0.85).
The average time to experiment completion was 15.6 min.
Across all treatment conditions, respondents score lower than
average on WtB (M = 2.05, SD = 0.97). Two-tailed t-testing
analysis indicates that the three vignettes resulted in sufficient
variance in the bribery treatment. Respondents’ WtB decreases
strictly and transitively the darker the shade of bribery from
white (M = 2.65, SD = 0.95) to black bribery (M = 1.60,
SD = 0.79), which indicates a strong and robust treatment effect
[t(284) = −10.076, p = 0.000, d = −1.200]. Pairwise correlation
analysis indicates high internal discriminant validity of the three
treatment scenarios (AIC = 0.057) and satisfactory construct
validity (Cronbach’s α = 0.45).
The Netherlands
The data of study 3 were collected at the faculties for business and
social studies at two public universities in the Netherlands. The
sample (n = 193) is slightly dominated by female (51.8%) and
non-religious (67.7%) participants, with an average age of 21.1
(± 2.8) years, who are predominantly risk-averse. Respondents
are mostly students of Business Administration (36.1%) or
Socioeconomics (31.3%). Respondents score relatively high on
the compound PSM scale (M = 5.38, SD = 0.92), especially
high on APM (M = 5.86, SD = 1.06) and especially low but
still clearly above average on SS (M = 5.01, SD = 1.36; seven-
point scale). The sample reveals high average SVO (M = 6.11,
SD = 3.76), and perceived the scenarios as realistic (across all
vignettes: M = 2.05, SD = 0.78). The average time to completion
of the experiment was 13.7 min. Over all treatments, respondents
score medium high on WtB (M = 1.94, SD = 0.96). Participants’
response on WtB decrease strictly and transitively from the white
(M = 2.69, SD = 0.90) to the black bribery treatment (M = 1.39,
SD = 0.66), indicating a strong and robust treatment effect
[t(255) = −13.088, p = 0.000, d = −1.639]. Pairwise correlation
analysis shows that the three treatment conditions have high
internal discriminant validity (inter-item covariance = 0.090) and
high construct validity (Cronbach’s α = 0.61).
Main Analysis
The three country-specific data sets were pooled to a total
sample of n = 1,242 in order to test our hypotheses and account
for country-specific effects. Furthermore, the larger n implies
that the hypotheses can be tested with greater power then by
analyzing individual country samples. All clustered regression
models are well specified [F(df, 621) = 6.28—12.94, p < 0.000],
and multicollinearity was not an issue (mean VIF = 1.27—
1.71). Estimates reveal that across all samples, women are far
less likely to bribe (β = −0.191, p = 0.007). In accordance with
our expectations, WtB strictly and transitively decreases with
darkening shades of bribery (white against black: 1β = |0.265|;
p < 0.000).
Robust linear regression estimation with both WtB as the
combined measure as well as its four components separately
(likelihood, justification, affect, and mistake) as the dependent
variable and including overall PSM’s and SVO’s direct effect
(see Models II in Table 2) shows, first, that the relationship
of PSM and WtB is negative throughout (e.g., β = −0.013
for composite WtB) but not statistically significantly so (e.g.,
p = 0.056 for composite WtB) with the exception of mistake.
Regarding the latter, higher PSM is significantly and positively
linked with respondents’ awareness that engaging in bribes would
be a mistake (β = 0.103, p = 0.019). Sign-wise, this series
of findings is fully in line with H1. Second, we observe that
the relationship between SVO and WtB is consistently positive
across all bribery dimensions (β = |0.167—0.196|), except for
the negative estimate for mistake (β = 0.172), and statistically
significant (p = 0.001—0.026), which consistently goes against
with H2. Third, the multivariate regression analyses including
interaction effects (see Models III in Table 2) reveal only mild
and statistically insignificant interaction effects between PSM and
SVO, both on WtB and, fully consistently so, across all four WtB
items (β = |0.026—0.038|; p = 0.000—0.006). This implies absence
of any support for H3.
Finally, regarding H4, we note that the correlation between
PSM and SVO is substantial and statistically significant, but
negative (r = −0.412; p < 0.000). We estimate partial mediation
by conducting a full-blown moderated mediation analysis.
We do so by running a structural equation model (SEM),
including all control variables, using maximum likelihood
parameter estimation, clustering the data at the individual level
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of respondents for conditional contributions to the observations.
The estimated model has a good model-to-data fit (CFI = 0.165;
TLI = −1.027; RMSEA = 0.335; Chi2 (7) = 39,766.61). The main
findings are summarized in Figure 2.1
Regarding direct effects, high scores on SVO (SVO high) are
related strongly and negatively to PSM (β = −0.705, p < 0.000),
PSM is negatively but insignificantly associated with greater
willingness to engage in bribery (β = −0.002, p > 0.05), and SVO
has a weak and positive but statistically significant direct effect
on WtB (β = 0.028, p = 0.001).2 As far as indirect effects are
concerned, we hypothesized that the relationship between high
SVO and low WtB is mediated in the form of an indirect and
negative effect on WtB through PSM. This partial mediation is not
supported, though, because the standardized indirect coefficient
is not statistically significant (β = 0.002, p > 0.05). Moreover,
the PSM∗SVO interaction is positive but insignificant (β = 0.000,
p > 0.10). Consequently, we cannot provide any support for H4.
Overall, our SEM analyses are sign-consistent but insignificant
regarding H1, provide evidence against H2, and are unsupportive
as to H3 and H4. So, as far as H1, H2, and H3 is concerned,
the SEM findings are fully in line with the results of the robust
linear regression.
DISCUSSION
We first interpret the pattern of findings in line with the
guidelines of Meyer et al. (2017). In their editorial essay in
the Journal of International Business Studies, they argue that a
blind focus on p-value thresholds is misguided: Not only is any
p-value threshold arbitrary, but also are effect sizes equally, if
not more, important. First, the findings confirm that PSM is
directly and negatively associated with peoples’ willingness to
engage in bribery, but only significantly so regarding respondents’
awareness that engaging in a bribe would be a mistake. For all
other WtB items, the relationship is not statistically significant,
and small but positive (and hence sign-supportive). Note that we
find that the different underlying PSM dimensions have hardly
any significant effect on WtB, with the only exception being CPI
1Detailed SEM results, including those per WtB item, are available upon request.
2Detailed results available upon request.
(β = −0.039, p = 0.087; see Supplementary Appendix A.4.1 for
additional analyses) mediated through justification. Second, in
contrast, SVO’s relationships with WtB and the four underlying
items are sign-consistent and statistically significant, which
means that the people with higher SVO are more willing to
engage in bribery. This set of relationships is consistent across
all three country samples. Third, furthermore, we find a negative
correlation between the two forms of pro-sociality (PSM and
SVO), and no evidence for mediation or moderation. All in all, we
have sign-consistent support for H1, evidence that goes against
H2, and no support for H3 and H4.
Looking at this pattern of findings, two specifically represent
puzzles that require further interpretation, as we expected the
opposite: Why is SVO negatively related with PSM, and positively
with WtB? Given the fact that the association of the trait-based
other-regarding motive SVO with WtB is positive and that of
the attitude-based society-regarding motive of PSM with WtB is
negative, we may suspect that this has to do with the different
nature of the underlying motivational system. Indeed, because
of their very different natures and roots, we know from prior
work in motivational theory that differently-rooted motives often
are incongruent (see, e.g., Hermans et al. (2017), focusing on
explicit versus implicit motives). We speculate that the external
social norm-like antecedents of an individual’s PSM may be
suppressed by the internal intrinsic motive-like drivers of SVO.
Specifically, this might imply that SVO’s intrinsic motivation
to help specific and concrete others may overrule PSM’s norm-
driven “prescription” to not do so for the sake of serving a more
abstract public interest. Of course, we cannot be sure that our
interpretation is correct. And of course, the negative finding
for SVO might be a sample-specific statistical artifact that will
disappear in another sample. However, given that we replicate
the negative SVO-WtB and SVO-PSM associations in all three
country samples, we suspect that we may need an alternative
theory, such as the one suggested here, which has to be examined
in future work.
The three replicative country studies were conducted in three
West-European countries in which the tolerance for bribery
is perceived as relatively low (Wilhelm, 2002; Transparency
International, 2021), implying that the institutional environment
is unlikely to be a distinctive factor. Indeed, the analysis
does reveal only marginally small differences between samples.
FIGURE 2 | Results of SEM analyses. Results of structural equation modeling, describing direct and indirect paths; based on pooled data by N = 622 respondents
(n = 1,242 observations); ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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In comparison to the Belgian sample that served us as the
arbitrary reference category, faced with the same bribery
scenario, respondents from Germany found it easier to derive
contextual justification that leads to a higher willingness to
engage in bribery. In contrast, Dutch respondents were much
less likely to justify bribing, ceteris paribus. This relates to
research by Montinola and Jackman (2002), Davis and Ruhe
(2003), and Achim (2016), pointing out that the factors that
stimulate bribery can well be located at the greater macro-
level. Cultural and institutional environments frame individual
behavior by shaping expectations, attitudes, and norms that are
learned through socialization processes (Morgan, 2006), and
which are very specific to country cultures. Taking Hofstede’s
(1984) classical set of cultural dimensions, Germany scores
relatively low on indulgence compared with Belgium and the
Netherlands, which are very similar in this respect (Hofstede
and McCrae, 2004). Individuals socialized in cultures with low
indulgence are normally restrained by strict social norms, and
have a stronger tendency of responding to incentives to break
these rules, which might manifest in monetary but also emotional
bribes (Achim, 2016). This may explain why German respondents
highly driven by compassion are triggered to act more pro-
social when being confronted with pro-self behavior as a way of
engaging with the person in need by showing generosity. In our
context, this may translate into a higher willingness to engage in
bribery among our German sample.
Furthermore, respondents are more likely to accept the use of
bribery if they perceive the vignette treatment as more realistic.
This is a striking finding, contradicting extant theory in at
least two ways. First, despite its great potential, experimental
vignettes research has often been criticized for its limited external
validity on the argument that vignettes studies are too abstract.
Hence, such studies might not capture actual behavioral intent
under real-life conditions (Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen,
2016). Second, respondents would be expected to be more
willing to demonstrate socially acceptable behavior in a realistic
setting, implying a lower likelihood of accepting bribery since
bribery is subject to stigmatization, certainly in our set of
three Western-European countries (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007).
Empirical evidence regarding honesty in questionnaire responses
by Hughes and Huby (2004) and Kreuter et al. (2008) imply that
realism in vignette treatments can have a moderating effect on
the social desirability response bias, but only if the treatment
scenarios are directly related to respondents’ own experiences.
Consequently, the realism finding can be interpreted as evidence
that well-conducted and thoroughly pre-tested vignettes can be of
substantial value for behavioral experimental research that tries to
tackle the essential and delicate issues.
As said, PSM is a manifestation of the society-regarding
attitude-based motivational system, and SVO the manifestation
of the other-regarding trait-based motivational system. Here, in
the context of bribery research, we enter unknown territory.
We are not aware of any work examining the effect of such
differently-rooted motives, in isolation and in tandem, on
bribery. However, like any study, ours is subject to limitations.
First, we only focused on bribery in a specific student-teacher
setting, while the primary motives of public officials and business
employees to engage in bribery acts might be rooted in different
convictions, limiting the generalizability of the findings. Yet,
prior studies such as Gorsira et al. (2018) have shown that
primary motives from public officials and business employees
to engage in acts of bribery were virtually identical. Second,
measuring respondents’ context-dependent intention to bribe,
this study does not examine real-world behavior, but reveals
behavioral intent that might prime real-world behavior. Although
the realism of vignettes was pretested and controlled for, further
work is needed in the context of real-world behavior. Specifically,
given the social desirability bias, the acceptability of bribery
in this study might be underreported. Third, the study was
conducted, by design, in three countries with similar levels
of bribery. Nevertheless, our data reveal differences between
countries that point toward a more complex interaction between
the macro-institutional context and the micro-constructs of PSM
(dimensions) and SVO. Given that even in a multi-site study in
three countries selected for not being very different, interesting
differences exist, we strongly call for the replication of this study
in countries that are very different. Doing so will shed light on
the impact of macro institutional variations on the likelihood of
bribery, as well as on the interaction of macro, meso, and micro
determinants of such behavior.
CONCLUSION
The motivation of this study was to explore the connection
between bribery, PSM, and SVO. Using a multi-site replication
approach, the results of this study not only show that PSM
is significantly related to bribery, but also that SVO is an
antecedent of society-regarding PSM and that individuals with
a higher orientation toward social pro-other values are more
likely to accept the use of bribery. The results of this study
contribute to the broad discourse on both PSM and corruption
by illustrating how relevant concepts such as PSM and SVO in
isolation and in tandem affect bribery willingness. Furthermore,
our study comes with a few methodological advancements. First,
the research design proved to be robust by replicating the study in
three different countries. Second, the quasi-experimental design
provides the opportunity to find out to what extent bribery
is contextually dependent. Third, the vignettes and four-item
willingness-to-bribe measure that were developed within the
scope of this research are now validated in three different country
settings and can, thus, be used in future research.
Furthermore, the findings of this study are particularly
relevant for practice. Practitioners seeking to diminish the
likelihood of bribery should prefer to employ people with low
social value orientation, who are not so much driven by pro-
other motives, and who hold a high commitment to the public
interest. However, human resource managers in the private and
public sector should also recognize that—depending on the
greater cultural context, and perhaps counterintuitively—high
compassion with others and a tendency to put others’ goals first
can also lead to more susceptibility to bribery. Furthermore,
practitioners should keep an open eye on more subtle forms of
bribery such as emotional pleading or offering a helping hand,
because people are much more susceptible to these ‘white’ and
“gray” forms of bribery than to the classic brown envelop.
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We can identify a few avenues for future research. First,
the study calls for further replication in order to find out to
what extent the greater institutional context primes individual
behavior under varying levels of PSM and SVO, in isolation and
in tandem. Second, this study only focused on a pro-self form
of bribery. However, in line with a recent stream of conceptual
research (e.g., Schott and Ritz, 2018), the findings illustrate that
there might be a connection with pro-social forms of bribery as
well. Third, further studies are needed to understand whether the
effects of PSM and SVO revealed in the current study differ if the
treatment scenario was about being offered a bribe and deciding
whether or not to accept this bribe (in contrast to offering
the bribe oneself). Therefore, future studies are encouraged to
investigate whether PSM and SVO, in isolation and in tandem,
might also have an effect on pro-social behavior such as pro-
social rule-breaking.
A final future research issue relates to the fundamental
question as to the very nature of PSM. In the current
study, we used an explicit survey measure of PSM. Theory
distinguishes between two types of motivational systems: an
implicit system operating unconsciously, and an explicit system
that functions consciously. Implicit motives develop during early
childhood on the basis of non-verbal, affective experiences, and
explicit motives are acquired after the development of language
under the influence of explicit instructions of the social and
cultural environment (McClelland and Pilon, 1983; Kasser et al.,
2002). Moreover, importantly, implicit and explicit motives
fundamentally differ in their behavioral impact. Implicit motives
are associated with spontaneous, uncontrolled behavior, and
effort-related task performance; explicit human motives drive
behavior that is subject to conscious thought and deliberation,
such as self-reflective appraisals and deliberate choices (Perugini
et al., 2010; Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2010). Survey measures
of motives are explicit, as people consciously respond to
items. Implicit motives must be captured by non-explicit
measures (e.g., Bing et al., 2007; Payne and Gawronski, 2010;
Lang et al., 2012; Runge and Lang, 2019; Runge et al.,
2020). An example of such an implicit measure is the (Brief)
Implicit Association Test, or (B)IAT, which Slabbinck and
van Witteloostuijn (2020) used to develop an implicit PSM
measure, revealing that the explicit survey measure of PSM
is indeed very different from their implicit BIAT counterpart.
In future research, we hope to explore how explicit and
implicit motivational measures might impact the likelihood of
bribery differently.
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